Abstract: Consider the incentive constraints that define the correlated equilibria of a game. The duals of these linear constraints generate Markov chains on the players' strategy sets.
The weak inequalities in the incentive constraints (1) allow that a player might be indifferent between obeying and disobeying the mediator's recommendation in a correlated equilibrium. If a player would be indifferent between conforming to the correlated equilibrium and deviating from it, then we need to worry whether the slightest perturbation of incentives and beliefs might cause the equilibrium to unravel. For this reason, game theorists since Selten (1975) have studied equilibrium refinements such as perfect equilibrium, to identify when such players' indifference to deviation should be considered problematic in an equilibrium, and when it should not. (For a detailed review of this literature, see van Damme, 1991, for example.) There are only a few papers which have tried to extend equilibrium refinements such as perfectness to games where correlated equilibrium is the basic solution concept. (See Myerson, 1986, and Dhillon and Mertens, 1992.) In this paper, we offer a new perspective on this question. We begin in Section 2 by defining a class of elementary games where the problem of indifference to deviation does not arise in correlated equilibria. Then we develop a new technique, called dual reduction, that will enable us to reduce any game in strategic form to such an elementary game. The mathematical foundations of dual reduction are taken from Nau and McCardle's (1990) proof of existence of correlated equilibria, which we review in Section 3. The definition of dual reduction is developed in Section 4, and in Section 5 we show that iterative dual reduction can always generate an elementary game. Examples and refinements are discussed in Sections 6 and 7, and Section 8 contains the longer proofs. Notice that this definition implies that every pure strategy must have positive probability in µ, µ(c) > 0, i N, c C .
That is, a correlated equilibrium has elementary incentives if every pure strategy of every player has a positive probability of being recommended, and any player would strictly decrease his expected payoff by unilaterally deviating from any recommended strategy, when all other players are expected to obey the recommendations of the correlated equilibrium.
If µ is any correlated equilibrium and µ is a correlated equilibrium with elementarŷ incentives then, for any number between 0 and 1, (1 -)µ + µ is also a correlated equilibrium with elementary incentives. This fact is easy to verify, using the linearity of the incentive constraints. Thus, if a game has any correlated equilibrium with elementary incentives, then every correlated equilibrium can be approximated arbitrarily closely by correlated equilibria with elementary incentives. That is, we have the following fact. expect to strictly decrease his payoff by unilaterally deviating to y when x is recommended, or by i i
deviating to x when y is recommended. The Prisoner's Dilemma (Figure 2 ) is not elementary, because there is no way to make a planned deviation from x to y costly for player i. In fact, the strategy xi cannot be used with i i positive probability in any correlated equilibrium, because it is strongly dominated for player i. To reduce the Prisoners' Dilemma to an elementary game, we must recognize that the strategies x 1 and x are dominated and delete them from the game. After elimination of these dominated That is, the unique correlated equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium in which each player independently randomizes among his two strategies, choosing each with probability 1/2. In this unique equilibrium, each player is indifferent between his two pure strategies, and so Matching
Pennies is not an elementary game (even though this equilibrium actually is perfect).
To reduce Matching Pennies to an elementary game, we must acknowledge an inextricable connection between each player's two strategies and somehow consolidate them. The key to this reduction is in the interpretation that gives rise to the game's title "Matching Pennies." Suppose that strategies x and y are interpreted respectively as "put i's penny Heads-up" and "put i's penny i i
Tails-up." Player 2 pays a dollar to player 1 if their pennies match, but player 1 pays a dollar to player 2 if their pennies do not match. Then we could give either player the advice to forget about choosing Heads or Tails, and instead to simply toss the penny so that it is equally likely to fall Heads or Tails. In effect, this advice tells player i to consolidate the strategies x and y into a i i single randomized strategy that gives probability 1/2 to x and probability 1/2 to y . After such These examples illustrate the two general ways that nonelementary games can be reduced: by eliminating strategies that "bad" in some sense, and by consolidating strategies that are "inextricably connected" in some sense. Elimination of dominated strategies is a familiar idea; but the consolidation of inextricably connected strategies may be less familiar. Our goal here is to show how reductions of both kinds can be derived from a unified theory of dual reduction. The existence of correlated equilibria for finite games was known since the concept was first defined by Aumann (1974) , because correlated equilibria include all Nash equilibria, and Nash (1951) proved the general existence of Nash equilibria for all finite strategic-form games. Nash's proof relies on fixed-point theorems of algebraic topology, however. Hart and Schmeidler (1989) and Nau and McCardle (1990) directly proved the existence of correlated equilibria using the duality theorems of linear algebra. In this section, we review some key ideas from Nau and
McCardle's proof, because their techniques for proving existence of correlated equilibria will also be useful for showing how to reduce nonelementary games.
The first step in the proof is to set up a linear programming problem for which the optimal solutions are the correlated equilibria. There are several ways to do this, but the most useful formulation for our purposes is the following linear programming problem, which we may call the strategic incentive problem:
choose µ and to maximize (c ) i N i i subject to:
The constraints of this strategic incentive problem differ from the definition of correlated equilibrium only in that we have added the artificial variables (c ), so that feasibility of the i i problem can be trivially guaranteed by letting these unconstrained artificial variables become Like any linear programming problem, this strategic incentive problem is associated with a dual problem that has the same optimal value, by the duality theorem of linear programming (see Chvatal, 1983 , for example). Following Nau and McCardle (1990), we can formulate this dual problem and show directly that its optimal value is 0.
The dual problem has one decision variable for each constraint in the primal. We let choose and to minimize subject to:
Nau and McCardle (1990) have discussed the possible interpretations of these dual variables.
Here we review one useful interpretation.
A strategic transition matrix for player i is any such that Thus, the dual problem requires us to specify a profile of strategic transition matrices = ( ) and a number such that
For any ( , ) that satisfies these dual constraints, and for any correlated strategy µ in (C), we must have
But now consider a correlated strategy that is constructed by telling each player i to independently randomize over C according to a strategy that is -stationary. That is, consider µ such that Given the existence of correlated equilibria, we know that any optimal solution of the dual So henceforth let us say that is a dual vector for the game iff satisfies these conditions (which are the dual constraints with = 0).
Dual reductions
We have seen that a dual vector can be interpreted as a profile of Markov chains on the players' pure strategy sets. The fact that stationary distributions exist for the these Markov chains was the key step in proving that the dual problem has optimal value 0, which in turn implied that correlated equilibria must exist. That is, in a quest to find correlated equilibria, we found dual-stationary strategies first, and then we found the equilibria. This derivation suggests that these stationary strategies might form some kind of pre-equilibrium solution concept for games with communication. Following this intuition, let us see how a game is transformed when the players restrict themselves to randomized strategies that are stationary with respect to some dual vector = ( ) . Other -stationary strategies can be constructed by taking convex combinations of these i randomized strategies in C / , but it can be shown that these are all the -stationary strategies.
That is, any -stationary randomized strategy in (C ) must be equivalent to a random mixture of Thus, when we assume that the players use strategies that are stationary with respect to some dual vector , we get a reduced game / , and we can analyze the equilibria of this reduced game like any other finite strategic-form game. But now we must ask whether it would actually be rational for the players to act according to an equilibrium of the -reduced game, once we admit that any player could also deviate to a nonstationary strategy. That is, when we find an equilibrium in the -reduced game, is it also an equilibrium in the original game? The answer to this question is Yes. This result gives us our fundamental justification for studying dual reductions, and it is the main result of this paper. Its proof is given in Section 8.
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Theorem 1. Let be any dual vector for the game . If is any correlated equilibrium of the -reduced game / , then the -equivalent correlated strategy is also a correlated equilibrium of .
Iterative dual reduction
By Theorem 1, the equilibria of a dual reduction / form a nonempty subset of the equilibria of the original game . The game may have other equilibria of that do not correspond to any equilibria of / , however. Thus, dual reduction may be viewed as a tool for refining the set of equilibria.
But a dual reduction is itself another strategic-form game that may be further reducible, which can give us a further refinement of the equilibrium set. So we may say that an iterative dual reduction of is any / / /... Thus, dual reduction can be applied iteratively until we get to an elementary game, which must occur eventually because each nontrivial dual reduction strictly decreases the (finite) number of pure-strategy profiles. This basic result should be listed as our second theorem, because it suggests that game theorists may study elementary games without loss of generality.
Theorem 2. From any finite strategic-form game , an elementary game can be derived by iterative dual reduction. Dual reduction includes, as a special case, the elimination of dominated strategies. To verify this fact, suppose that a pure strategy e is (weakly) dominated for some player j by a j randomized strategy . Then
In this case, we can let be such that (y x ) (x ) = (x y ) (y ).
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So a nontrivial dual vector can only have the stationary strategies (x ) = 2/7, (y ) = 5/7, (x ) = 4/7, (y ) = 3/7, 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 which is the unique equilibrium.
(Similarly, for the Matching Pennies game in Figure 3 , it can be shown that any dual vector must satisfy (y x ) = (x y ) = (y x ) = (y x ). But then any nontrivial 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 dual vector can have only one stationary distribution for each player i, and that is the i equilibrium strategy that puts probability 1/2 on each pure strategy.)
Figures 6 and 7 show two games in which no pure strategies are dominated, and yet dual reduction can simplify the game and eliminate some equilibria. For Figure 6 , let be such that and it leaves player 2 with only one stationary strategy Then the -reduced game is as shown in Figure 8 . That is, we can find a dual vector that has a positive dual variable for every incentive 25 constraint that is binding at all correlated equilibria. Such a dual vector may be said to have full support.
We have seen that dual reduction is a powerful generalization of elimination of weakly dominated strategies. However, like elimination of weakly dominated strategies, there may be more than one way to apply dual reduction to any given game, because there may be more than one nontrivial dual vector. One possible way to avoid this ambiguity, at least in some examples, would be to only consider reduction by dual vectors that have full support. If is a dual vector with full support then / may be called a full dual reduction of .
In Figure 7 , among player 2's pure strategies, y jeopardizes x (in that deviating from y 2 2 2 to x is costless for player 2 in every correlated equilibrium), z jeopardizes y , and x jeopardizes 2 2 2 2 z . So a full dual reduction of this game must consolidate these three pure strategies, replacing 2 them by a single randomized strategy as shown in Figure 8 . Notice that x does not jeopardize y , 2 2 however, because deviating from y to x would be costly for player 2 in the (y ,y ) equilibrium of 
Proofs
To prove Theorem 1, we first prove two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let be a dual vector, let be in (C ), and 
